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Introduction
On October 9-11, 1979, the Commission of the European Communities
held hearings on a proposed group exemption' that would remove certain
types of patent licensing agreements from the prohibition of Article 85(1) of
the Treaty of Rome. 2 Although cast in the form of an exemption from Com-
mon Market antitrust rules, the proposed regulation takes an even stricter
view of many types of licensing agreements than does United States law. In
this article we shall compare the approach taken in the proposed group ex-
emption with the relevant United States law and explore some of the policy
considerations which underlie the American precedents and which may also
be applicable in the European Community.
I. Territorial Restrictions
Article 1.1(3) and (4) of the proposed group exemption would exclude
from the prohibitions of Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome, those patent
licensing agreements in which (i) the licensor grants the licensee an exclusive
*Messrs. Handler and Blechman practice law in New York City. Milton Handler is also pro-
fessor emeritus, Columbia University School of Law.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Louis A. Schapiro in the preparation of
this article.
tThis article is adapted from a memorandum prepared by the authors for the Commission of
the European Communities. Treaty of Rome, COMM. MKT. REP [CCH] [hereinafter cited as
Treaty].
'Proposed Regulation 3 CoMm. MKT. REP. (CCH) 10, 118 [hereinafter cited as Proposal].2Article 85(1) prohibits agreements and concentrated practices "which may affect trade be-
tween Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the common market .... Article 85(3) then provides that
individual exemptions from Article 85(1) may be declared in specified circumstances. Regulation
19, promulgated by the Council of the European Communities in 1965, authorized the Commis-
sion to adopt certain group exemptions, including the proposed group exemption for patent
licensing agreements.
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territory where neither the licensor nor other licensees may sell the licensed
product, or (ii) the licensee agrees not to sell the licensed product in a territory
reserved for the licensor or for another licensee.I The exemption for these two
types of territorial restrictions is, however, made subject to certain condi-
tions in Article 1.2, one of which is that the turnover of the licensor or licensee
whose territory is to be protected may not exceed 100 million units of account
(about $175 million (U.S.)).' Thus, the net effect of the draft proposal is to
treat territorial restrictions in simple one-way licenses as prima facie unlaw-
ful (subject only to possible individual exemption under Article 85(3) ) in all
cases where the entity being protected is a company of international size. This
result is directly contrary to the rules, doctrines and policies of United States
law.
A. The United States Law
In the United States, territorial restrictions in simple one-way patent li-
censes have been held lawful in all cases in which they have been considered.'
As demonstrated below, this rule of virtual per se legality has deep roots in
American jurisprudence.
It is a fundamental principle of United States patent law that a licensing
agreement is lawful so long as it merely transfers all or a part of the patentee's
rights under his patent rather than purporting to enlarge his patent monop-
oly.6 One way in which a patentee can transfer a part of his patent rights is by
granting a territorially restricted license; that is, the patentee, having the
exclusive right to sell a patented product throughout the United States, may
transfer a part of that right by granting someone an exclusive license to sell
the product in a defined portion of the country. The right of a patentee to
parcel out his patent monopoly in this manner has been recognized by statute
since the earliest days of the United States. Since 1836, the United States
Patent Code has included in one form or another a section comparable to the
present section 261, which provides that a patentee may "grant and convey
an exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or
any specified part of the United States" (emphasis added.)' There is thus no
'Proposal, supra note 1, arts. 1.1(3), 1.1(4).
'Id. at art. 1.2.
'Dunlop Company, Ltd. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied. 415
U.S. 917 (1974); Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1954); American
Optical Co. v. New Jersey Optical Co., 58 F. Supp. 601 (D. Mass. 1944). See also United States v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 141 F. Supp. 118 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
'A licensing agreement might be found to unlawfully enlarge a patent monopoly when, for
example, it requires a licensee to purchase unpatented supplies in order to obtain the right to use
a patented machine. In such a case, the patentee would be unlawfully using his patent to obtain
an advantage in the sale of products outside the scope of the patent grant. See, e.g., International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
'35 U.S.C. § 261 (1976). See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 11, 5 Stat. 117 (1836) which refers to
the "grant and conveyance of the exclusive right under any patent to make and use ... the thing
patented, within and throughout any specific part or portion of the United States"; Act of July
8, 1870, ch. 230, § 36, 16 Stat. 203 (amended 1897, 1922 & 1941), which is cast in substantially the
same terms as the present section 261; 35 U.S.C. § 47 (1946), which also is substantially similar
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doubt that under United States law the right to grant territorially exclusive
licenses is an inherent part of the patent monopoly.
This principle has also long been recognized in our case law. For example,
in 1852 the Supreme Court noted in Bloomer v. McQuewan8 that when a
patentee conveys "the exclusive privilege of making or vending [the patented
product] for use in a particular place, the purchaser buys a portion of the
franchise which the patent confers." 9 More recently, in United States v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp.,'" which involved an exclusive license to sell a pat-
ented product east of the Mississippi River, the district court held that:
"Viewed simply as a territorial limitation upon Crown's license, this agree-
ment is a valid exercise of ALSCO's patent rights. . . . Territorial licenses,
without more, are a reasonable means for the patentee to secure the reward
granted to him." ' '
The American courts have upheld not only patent licensing arrangements
imposing territorial restrictions within the United States, but also those con-
taining export and import restraints. In American Optical Co. v. New Jersey
Optical Co., 2 the licensee of two United States patents covering components
used in making eyeglasses had covenanted in the license agreement not to sell
the patented products in England, Northern Ireland, France or Germany.
The court held that:
[t]he owner or holder of exclusive patent rights to make, use and sell may carve out
of his grant a limited monopoly for a license. There is no doubt that a patentee may
place territorial restrictions on licenses within the limits of the United States. It
seems equally clear that the patentee is free to reserve for himself the advantages of
competing in foreign countries by retaining the exclusive right of access to these
markets. 'I
Similarly, in Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., " a German patentee
licensed certain United States patents to an American firm, which agreed not
to export the patented articles. At the same time, the German licensor agreed
not to import the patented articles into the United States. Upholding both
restrictions, the court noted preliminarily that "[it is a fundamental rule of
patent law that the owner of a patent may license another and prescribe
territorial limitations."' The court then held that the export restriction "was
an agreement by [the American company] to honor the territorial limits of the
license granted, and was lawful."' 6 With respect to the import restriction, the
court held: "This was an agreement by [the German patentee] that the li-
to section 261. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1976) was adopted in 1952 and was amended in 1975 without any
relevant change in substance.
S55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852).
'Id. at 549.
"°141 F. Supp. 118 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
"Id. at 127.
'258 F. Supp. 601 (D. Mass. 1944).
"Id. at 606.
"1211 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1954).
1Id. at 128.
"Id. at 129.
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cense granted [to the American company] was an exclusive license .... Ex-
clusive territorial licenses granted under patents are old in the law. Unless
they run afoul of the antitrust laws for other reasons ... they are legal."' 7
Finally, in Dunlop Company, Ltd. v. Kelsey Hayes Co., ," a British com-
pany with patents in the United States entered into licensing agreements with
various non-United States firms regarding its counterpart foreign patents.
These agreements prohibited the non-United States firms from selling the
patented product in the United States. The court held that
[The British firm's] agreements with its licensees in Japan, Italy, Germany and
Australia cannot be characterized as true horizontal agreements dividing markets.
They are merely territorial licenses granted by a patentee such as are permitted by 35
U.S.C. § 261. If one who received a patent from the United States may so restrict his
licenses without violating the domestic antitrust laws, it would seem clear that a
patentee could do the same thing with foreign licenses without violating the anti-
trust laws of this country.' 9
It should be noted that, while the legality of territorial restraints in patent
licensing agreements is recognized in the United States as a matter of patent
law which excludes the application of antitrust, such restraints also would be
legal under antitrust principles. The American antitrust laws recognize the
legality of restraints which are ancillary to the transfer of various kinds of
business assets, including technology. This "ancillary restraints doctrine,"
which has deep roots in American law,2" has been specifically applied to
uphold territorial restrictions in licensing agreements transferring unpat-
ented know-how. 2' Furthermore, as demonstrated below in the discussion of
relevant policy considerations, restraints which are properly ancillary to the
transfer of patented or unpatented technology promote rather than restrict
competition and, for that reason as well, do not violate the antitrust laws.
Of course, there may be territorial restrictions in reciprocal patent licenses
that are part and parcel of some larger cartel agreement to divide markets and
"Id.
"1484 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974).
"Id. at 417.
2 Indeed, the doctrine goes back to the English common law. As early as 1711, the King's
Bench in Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181,24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711), upheld a covenant by the
assignor of a bakery business not to practice the baker's trade for five years within a certain
township. In the United States, the Supreme Court held in 1873 in Oregon Steam Navigation Co.
v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64 (1873), that the seller of a steamboat could enforce an agreement
made with the buyer that the latter would not operate the steamer in California waters for ten
years. Similarly, a contract restricting the territory in which a purchaser of a patent medicine
formula could manufacture and sell the product was found to be a reasonable, ancillary restraint
in Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88 (1889). The rationale for the "ancillary restraints doctrine" was
stated as follows by Judge (later Chief Justice) Taft in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899):
[W]hen one in business sold property with which the buyer might set up a rival business, it was
certainly reasonable that the seller should be able to restrain the buyer from doing him an
injury which, but for the sale, the buyer would be unable to inflict. This was not reducing
competition, but was only securing the seller against an increase of competition of his own
creating. 85 F. at 280-81.
"See Part 11, infra (discussion of know-how licensing) and cases cited therein.
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that consequently would create problems under American antitrust law. Such
arrangements, however, are outside the scope of the proposed group exemp-
tion in any event: It does not include market division agreements, but also
specifically excludes reciprocal patent licensing arrangements.2 2 Unfortu-
nately, the proposed group exemption not only excludes such clearly anti-
competitive agreements as market divisions and reciprocal patent licensing
agreements; it also bars the use by larger companies of properly limited terri-
torial restrictions in simple one-way patent licenses that are not anticompeti-
tive and that unquestionably would be legal under United States law.23 As we
shall show, this result is contrary not only to the patent and antitrust jurispru-
dence of the United States, but also to policy considerations which are univer-
sal in their application.
B. Policy Considerations
American law reflects a recognition that permitting territorial restrictions
to be imposed in patent licenses is likely to be in the public interest for a
number of reasons. For one thing, the net effect of allowing such restraints is
likely to be beneficial rather than harmful to competition. On the one hand, a
properly limited territorial restraint merely restricts competition which
would not exist at all without the patent license. For example, if a licensee is
limited to selling a patented product in a specified area, he is not restricted in
the use of his own technology or in competing in any other way that was open
to him before the license was entered into; he is limited only in his use of
patents which would not have been available to him at all without the license.
On the other hand, if territorial restrictions are not permitted, the patentee
may decide not to license. This will hurt competition in a number of ways.
Licensing promotes competition in the long run because it puts the licensee in
a position to begin competing with the licensor immediately after the patent
expires. It also promotes competition in the short run because the first sale of
a patented product usually exhausts the patent monopoly under both Euro-
pean Community and United States law. 4 Thus, even if the licensee is himself
precluded from selling outside a particular territory, subsequent purchasers
will be able to sell throughout the entire market so that the license will have
the inevitable effect of creating immediate competition at the secondary or
distributor level. In addition, to the extent that licensing makes a new tech-
"See Proposal, supra note 1, art. 5.3.23A territorial restriction might also create problems under United States law if it extended
beyond the scope of the licensed patent, e.g., if it prohibited the licensee from using its own
technology in a given area. Again, however, such cases would be beyond the scope of the pro-
posed group exemption in any event.2
"See, e.g., Centrafarm B.V. & Adriaan de Peijper v. Sterling Drug, Inc., [1974] C.J. Comm.
E. Rec. 1147, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8246; Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S.(17 Wall.) 453 (1873). In the European Community, under Regulation 67/67, 1 COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 12727 certain restrictions may be imposed after the first sale of nonpatented as well
as patented goods in terms of the territories in which distributors may solicit business. Similarly,
in the United States, certain restrictions may be imposed with respect to the territories in which
distributors may resell goods. See, e.g., Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977).
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nology more widely available than would otherwise be the case, it imme-
diately increases competition between the new technology and competing
older technologies. Thus, whether one takes a long- or short-term point of
view, legal requirements which discourage patent licensing - and which lead
patentees to keep their inventions to themselves - are inherently anti-
competitive.
Another social goal to be considered is the development and dissemination
of technology. If patentees are discouraged from licensing, one consequence
may be to deprive the public of the benefit of new technology. Another result
may be that technology available in one part of the Common Market will not
be available in other parts. Similarly, if United States, Japanese or other
foreign companies are discouraged from licensing, it may impair the flow of
technology to the European Community from the rest of the industrialized
world. 5 In addition, both foreign and European patentees anxious to find
licensees to help them exploit their technology may be unable to do so without
territorial restrictions. Particularly where the development of technology is
expensive and entails substantial business risks, licensees may be unwilling to
make the investment necessary to develop and exploit a new technology
without some assurance that neither the licensor nor other licensees will be
using the identical technology to compete in the same area.
One objective of the proposed group exemption appears to be to protect
the interests of small and medium-sized companies. However, a provision
which discourages licensing, even if aimed at relatively large licensors, will
inevitably hurt small and medium-sized firms, since these are typically the
kinds of businesses that become licensees. If the large companies are forced
to either exploit their patents on their own or not at all, it will be the smaller
firms that lack research and development capabilities that will suffer.
While the proposed group exemption appears to recognize the general
necessity for territorial restrictions in patent licensing agreements, it draws
the line at firms having a turnover of more than 100 million units of account.
There is no precedent in American law for such a limitation. Indeed, under
American law, territorial restrictions may be imposed by companies having
turnovers of well over 100 million units of account even with respect to the
sale of nonpatented goods.26
Furthermore, as a matter of policy, the 100 million unit of account limita-
tion is counterproductive. According to the preamble to the proposed group
exemption, it is the firms with turnovers of more than 100 million units of
"Foreign firms may find that the prima facie illegality of territorial restrictions under the
proposed group exemption forces them to choose among three alternatives: (1) exploiting their
patents themselves in the European Community; (2) having a single Community-wide licensee;
or (3) not exporting their technology to the European Community. In terms of the social goals
of encouraging the development and dissemination of technology, promoting competition and
protecting the interests of small and medium-sized businesses, all of these alternatives would
appear to be less desirable than having a multiplicity of smaller licensees, each operating in a
specified territory.
"See, e.g., Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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account that "hold the bulk of the patents in force in the common market.""
Also, a glance at Fortune's lists of the 500 largest United States firms and the
500 largest non-United States firms shows that all 1,000 of them - including
most of the world's chemical, oil, electronics and pharmaceutical producers
- have turnovers far in excess of the specified limit." In other words, the
effect of limiting the availability of territorial restrictions to companies hav-
ing turnovers of more than 100 million units of account is to discourage
licensing by precisely those companies that have something to license.
Explaining the rationale for the 100 million unit of account limitation, the
preamble to the proposed group exemption states:
The Commission accepts that [territorial] protection is necessary for the majority of
undertakings as-a determining factor to facilitate decisions on investments relating
to the development and marketing of new technologies. For undertakings with very
high turnovers this protection would not, on the other hand, seem appropriate
having regard to their extensive financial resources. 9
The preamble does not explain why territorial protection would be any less
necessary for larger firms or why their more extensive financial resources
would make this protection inappropriate. In fact, it is precisely because of
the greater financial resources of larger firms that they are most likely to
choose not to license and to exploit their patents on their own, or not at all, if
territorial restrictions are not available. Thus, the 100 million unit of account
provision would make territorial restrictions prima facie unlawful in the very
cases where this result will most probably discourage licensing and thereby
hurt competition, retard technological development and subvert the interests
of small and medium-sized companies."
Turning to a final policy goal which is of great concern to the European
Community - the achievement of economic integration - again there
would appear to be no reason to treat territorial restrictions as prima facie
unlawful. As previously indicated, territorially restricted patent licenses have
been considered lawful in the United States since at least 1836. At no time has
anyone suggested that such territorial restrictions have interfered with the
functioning of an integrated market in the United States. Indeed, thereseems
to be no evidence that territorial restrictions in patent licenses have had any
adverse social or economic effects in the United States. Furthermore, the
exhaustion doctrine - established in such American cases as Adams v.
"Proposal, supra note 1, at art. l(2)(a).
"Citation omitted.
"Proposal, supra note 1, at art. l(2)(a).
"In addition, even if it did make sense to make the availability of territorial restrictions in
patent licenses dependent upon the market power of the licensor or licensee being protected, the
overall turnover of a company has no necessary relation to its economic power. The teaching of
American antitrust jurisprudence is that economic power must be examined in terms of a
company's share of some relevant market. Many American firms may have annual turnovers of
more than 100 million units of account but still be insignificant factors in any conceivably
relevant European market.
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Burke, 3 and in the European Community in cases such as Centrafarm B. V.
& Adriaan dePeijper v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,32 - virtually ensures that territo-
rial restrictions in patent licenses cannot have any significant adverse effect
on economic integration because there will always be free movement of goods
throughout the entire market after the first sale. On the other hand, treating
territorial restrictions in patent licenses as prima facie unlawful - and
thereby discouraging patent licensing - can significantly harm economic
integration by (among other things) impeding the flow of technology among
the various parts of the Common Market.
In sum, all relevant policy considerations, as well as American legal doc-
trine, support the legality of appropriately limited territorial restraints in
simple one-way patent licenses. Significantly, not even the most ardent critics
of patent licensing restrictions in the United States appear to question the
necessity for, or legality of, such territorial provisions. The American expe-
rience thus would strongly suggest a need to reevaluate the sections of the
proposed group exemption that would severely limit the availability of terri-
torial restraints in patent licenses even in cases where there is no apparent
doctrinal or policy justification for this approach.
II. Know-How Licensing Restrictions
The proposed group exemption contains a number of provisions which
appear to be fundamentally hostile to the licensing of know-how:
Article 3(10) condemns licensing agreements that prohibit licensees from
using know-how after the expiration of the license, although it permits licen-
sors to require payment for the use of their know-how for an "appropriate
period" after the agreement terminates. The effect of this provision is that
know-how can never be transferred except in perpetuity. 33
Article 3(11) condemns field-of-use restrictions in know-how licenses, sub-
ject only to the licensor's right to charge an "appropriately higher" royalty
for unauthorized uses.
34
The proposed group exemption contains no provision covering territorial
restrictions in know-how licenses, which means that all such agreements pre-
sumably would be subject to Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome unless an
individual exemption were granted under Article 85(3). 3"
Underlying all of these provisions is the assumption that the licensing of
know-how is somehow less desirable than patent licensing and that agree-
ments which, in the words of the preamble, are "designed to give the licensor
the same protection for secret know-how as for a patent,"" should be con-
demned. As demonstrated below, both the know-how provisions of the pro-
3184 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873).
"[1974] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1147, 11974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 18246.
"Proposal, supra note 1, at art. 3(10).
"Id., art. 3(11).
"See note 2, supra.
3Proposal, supra note 1, at art. 1(2)(a).
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posed group exemption and the assumption which lies beneath them are con-
trary to United States law and to the legal doctrines and policies upon which
the American jurisprudence is based.
A. The United States Law
While Article 3(10) condemns all licensing provisions that require know-
how to be returned after the expiration of a license, under American law,
such clauses clearly are valid. Indeed, if they were not, know-how would only
be subject to sale (i.e., a transfer in perpetuity) and could never be licensed.
The American authorities leave no doubt that the licensing of know-how is
deemed to be very much in the public interest.
In Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 37 a licensee contested its licensor's right
to demand the return of drawings, data and other know-how materials at the
expiration of the license. Holding for the licensor, Judge Friendly noted that
[iun thousands of contracts businessmen have divulged such secrets to competitors,
dealing at arms' length and well able to protect themselves, on the faith that mu-
tually acceptable provisions for payment, for the preservation of confidentiality,
and for the return of the secret information on termination or default will be en-
forced by the courts. 3'
The court added:
The district judge [who held for the licensee] cited no data to prove that licensing of
trade secrets had worked adversely to the public interest. To the contrary, such facts
as have been brought to our notice indicate that the sharing of technological know-
how on the basis of proper agreements has been beneficial not only within this
country but in its relations with others."'
The court found that know-how licensing has a pro- rather than an anticom-
petitive effect: "[R]ather than having a monopolistic tendency. . . the up-
holding of private agreements for the sharing of trade secrets on mutually
acceptable terms tends against the owner's hoarding them."' 0
The court also found that a rule invalidating the licensing of know-how
"will have the detrimental effect of limiting the use to which the ideas are put,
contrary to the public interest in maximizing the utilization of intellectual
resources.""'
The holding and reasoning of the Painton case were adopted and endorsed
by the Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,'2 discussed more
fully below.
American law also disagrees with the proposed exemption's position on
field-of-use restrictions in know-how licenses.' In A.&E. Plastik Pak Co.





"416 U.S. 470 (1974).
"'Proposal, supra note 1, at art. 3(11).
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Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,4 4 the court upheld the legality of an agreement in
which a licensee was authorized to use know-how to produce a certain chemi-
cal product for its own use but not for sale to others. The court held:
The agreement between Monsanto and A. & E., on its face, appears to be a
license of technology or "know-how," to which restraints of competition are at-
tached as conditions of the license. Thus, on its face, it does not appear to be an
agreement between competitors not to compete, for absent the licensed know-how
A. & E. is in no position to compete.
4
1
The American cases have similarly upheld territorial restrictions in know-
how licenses. Indeed, such restraints have been held lawful in Supreme Court
cases dating as far back as 1889.6 In a 1911 case, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 7 the Supreme Court stated that a "secret process
may be the subject of confidential communication and of sale or license to
use with restrictions as to territory .. ''48 The rationale for this rule was
explained as follows in Shin Nippon Koki Co., Ltd. v. Irvin Industries,
Inc.:"9
The rationale behind the rule is that since the owner of a secret process, so long as he
keeps it secret, is entitled to use it or not, as he pleases, with impunity from the
antitrust laws, he should be encouraged to make it available for the benefit of the
public at large. As an incentive to the accomplishment of this goal, and to insure
him a satisfying reward for his creative skill and diligence, he should, like the owner
of a patent, be allowed to place reasonable competitive restraints upon those to
whom he has granted the right to its use and who, but for such grant, would be
unable to compete with him."'
Finally, the assumption underlying the know-how provisions of the pro-
posed group exemption-i.e., that know-how is inherently less worthy of
protection in licensing agreements than patents-is contrary to United States
law. In Kewanee Oil Co.,5 the Supreme Court made clear its view that the
protection of trade secrets or know-how "will encourage invention in areas
where patent law does not reach, and will prompt the independent innovator
to proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his invention. Competition
is fostered and the public is not deprived of the use of valuable, if not quite
"396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968).
"Id. at 714-15.
"See Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88 (1889).
"220 U.S. 373 (1911).
4"ld. at 402. See also Thoms v. Sutherland, 52 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1931); United States v.
du Pont & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, (D. Del. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 377 (1956);
Foundry Services v. Beneflux Corp., 110 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), rev'don other grounds,
206 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1953).
411975] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,347. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1975).
"Id. at J 66,440. The court in Shin Nippon Koki Co. held that a territorial restriction in a
know-how license is "ancillary," and therefore lawful, if
(1) the subject matter of the license is substantial, valuable, secret know-how; (2) such restraint
is limited to the 'life' of the know-how; i.e., the period during which it retains its secrecy; and
(3) such restraint is limited to those products only which are-made by use of the know-how.
•. .Id.
'416 U.S. 470 (1974).
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patentable, invention." 52 In Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.," the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed its adherence to the position stated in the Kewanee
Oil Co. decision. The Court noted that "[plermitting inventors to make en-
forceable agreements licensing the use of their [nonpatented] inventions in
return for royalties provides an additional incentive to invention.""" It is thus
clear that under United States law the protection and licensing of know-how
is considered to be in the public interest for much the same reasons that the
protection and licensing of patents is deemed to be socially and economically
desirable.
It may also be noted that Aronson held that a licensing agreement for the
manufacture and sale of a nonpatented device could provide for the payment
of royalties after the know-how involved had entered the public domain. The
case is thus directly contrary to Article 3.4(d) of the proposed group regula-
tion, which would prohibit all agreements obligating licensees to pay royal-
ties on know-how that had entered the public domain."
B. Policy Considerations
The public interest factors discussed in Part I of this article, which support
the legality of territorial restrictions in patent licenses, apply a fortiori to
justify the kinds of restraints in know-how licenses that we are dealing with
here. As in patent licenses, a proper ancillary restraint in a know-how license
merely limits competition that would not exist at all without the license, i.e.,
competition in the use of technology to which the licensee would have no
access but for the license. On the other hand, the proposed group exemption
presents an owner of know-how with more disincentives to licensing than is
the case with a patentee. The know-how owner is faced with a probable ban,
not only on territorial restraints, but also on all field-of-use restrictions and
even on the basic concept of a terminable license. When one also considers
that an owner of unpatented technology is under no compulsion to license or
sell his know-how without adequate provisions to protect him from the com-
petition of his licensee or buyer and without reasonable compensation for the
use of his property, it appears highly probable that, under the proposed
group exemption, many companies with valuable know-how will choose not
to license. Moreover, the socially undesirable consequences of decisions not
to license will be more severe in the case of know-how than in the case of
patents. Unlike a patentee whose invention will enter" the public domain
within a fixed number of years, an owner of know-how can hoard his tech-
nology forever unless someone else happens to develop it independently.
Thus, in terms of the goal of promoting competition, legal provisions which
discourage licensing are likely to be even more counterproductive in the case
of know-how than with patents.
"Id. at 485.
"99 S. Ct. 1096 (1979), [19791 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 1 62,477 (1979).
"Id. at 1099, [1979] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 62, 477 at p. 76, 795, FORTUNE, May 7, 1979 at 268.
"Proposal, supra note I, at art. 3.4.(d).
414 INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER
The same is true with respect to promoting the development, dissemination
and efficient use of technology. As the United States Supreme Court stated in
Kewanee Oil Co., 6 if know-how cannot be protected, then, instead
of licensing others to use his invention and making the most efficient use of existing
manufacturing and marketing structures within the industry, the trade secret holder
would tend either to limit his utilization of the invention, thereby depriving the
public of the maximum benefit of its use, or engage in the time-consuming and
economically wasteful enterprise of constructing duplicative manufacturing and
marketing mechanisms for the exploitation of the invention."
In addition, if contractual clauses generally regarded as essential to know-
how licensing are treated within the Community as prima facie unlawful, one
would expect that American, Japanese and other foreign firms would neces-
sarily become extremely cautious about licensing in Common Market coun-
tries. In that case, the flow of technology from the rest of the industrialized
world to the European Community could be adversely affected.
With respect to the policy goal of protecting small and medium-sized busi-
nesses, legal provisions which discourage know-how licensing again would
appear to be harmful. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in
Kewanee Oil Co., "Trade secret law promotes the sharing of knowledge, and
the efficient operation of industry; it permits the individual inventor [or, one
might add, the small company with potentially valuable know-how] to reap
the rewards of his labor by contracting with a company large enough to
develop and exploit it.""
Similarly, know-how licensing also permits smaller companies without sig-
nificant research and development capacity to share technology developed by
larger companies. The proposed exemption would make it impossible to have
a terminable license, 9 which would be particularly harmful to small and
medium-sized companies. If a license must be perpetual, the natural impulse
of most owners of know-how will be to license only very large firms that can
be depended upon to exploit the know-how and to generate royalty income
for a very long period of time, rather than to take chances with relatively
small, unknown licensees. Thus, by depriving licensors of the flexibility of
having a terminable license, the proposed group exemption may prevent
many smaller companies from obtaining technology licenses at all.
The provisions in the proposed group exemption with respect to know-how
will also interfere with patent licensing. Many patent licenses contain provi-
sions for the licensing of unpatented know-how, which is often necessary to
allow licensees to exploit licensed patents. The draft regulation will in many
"416 U.S. 470 (1974).
"Id. at 486-87.
"Id. at 493.
"See Proposal, supra note I, at art. 3.10. Kewanee also makes the point that, if know-how
cannot be adequately protected by law, it may require companies to take increasingly expensive
security precautions. As a result, the Court noted that "[s]maller companies would be placed at a
distinct economic disadvantage, since the costs of this kind of self-help could be great, and the
cost to the public of the use of this invention would be increased." 416 U.S. at 486.
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cases encourage patentees to license their patents without the accompanying
know-how-a practice which will redound to the disadvantage of licensors,
licensees and the general public to the extent to which the latter has an interest
in the efficient dissemination of technology.6"
There is, then, no support in either American law or policy for adopting
provisions which discourage know-how licensing or for regarding know-how
as inherently less worthy of protection in licenses than patents. Significantly,
in Shin Nippon Koki Co., Ltd. v. Irvin Industries, Inc.I the authority ap-
parently relied upon by the licensee in that case in support of a contrary view
"consist[ed] of quotations from published articles by employees of the U.S.
Department of Justice and certain other commentators. '6 The court noted
that
[t]hese views, however, are unmistakably those of advocates and seem to represent
little more than the personal politico-economic philosophies of their authors. In
any event, they appear to go well beyond the compass or intendment of any existing
judicial determinations upon the questions at issue and are, accordingly, rejected. 3
In sum, all legally cognizable authority in American jurisprudence fully sup-
ports the legality of proper ancillary restraints in know-how licenses, and the
policies underlying that authority would appear to be every bit as applicable
in Europe as in the United States.
III. Field-of-Use Restrictions
Article 2. 1(1) of the proposed group exemption exempts from the prohibi-
tions of Article 85(1) licensing provisions which impose on a licensee "the
obligation to restrict the manufacture of the patented product or the use of
the patented process to one or more different technical fields of application
of the invention within the patent claims."" To the extent that this provision
would permit field-of-use restrictions in patent licensing agreements, it is in
accord with United States law.65 On the other hand, Article 3(8) of the pro-
"it is unclear to what extent the proposed group exemption applies at all to licenses covering
both patents and know-how. The preamble states that
It is appropriate to extend this Regulation to patent licensing agreements containing ancillary
provisions concerning the assignment or the right of use of secret manufacturing processes or
know-how relating to the use or application of industrial technology, as in practice patent
licensing agreements with such ancillary provisions are very frequent. (emphasis added.) Pro-
posal, supra note I at art. l(2)(a)
However, the regulation does not define the term "ancillary provisions" and it is consequently
impossible to tell from the text of the proposed group exemption whether, for example, a blanket
agreement licensing a company's patented and unpatented technology in a given field would be
covered by the draft regulation.
"[1975] I TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,347. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1975).
"Id. at 66, 443.
"Id.
"Proposal, supra note 1, at art. 2.1(1).
"The clause continues however, "For the purposes of this subparagraph there are different
technical fields of application where the relevant products in each of the fields from which the
licensee is excluded differ in a material respect from the products for which the license is
granted." Id.
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posed exemption prohibits "restrictions on one or both parties as to uses of
the licensed products going beyond the patent claims, particularly as regards
the way in which and the customers to whom the products are to be sold."1
6
As we shall show, this latter provision is contrary to the rules, doctrines and
policies of American jurisprudence.
A. The United States Law
The leading American case in this area is the Supreme Court's 1938 deci-
sion in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 7 which up-
held the legality of a field-of-use restriction. The defendants in that case
licensed patents for vacuum tubes and amplifiers for use in the "private"
field, i.e., in home radio equipment, and reserved the commercial field to
themselves. The Court found these licensing arrangements to be lawful on the
ground that a patentee "may grant licenses... upon conditions not inconsis-
tent with the scope of the [patent] monopoly. . .. ""
The Court was not making new law in General Talking Pictures; that deci-
sion was antedated by a line of cases going back at least to the middle of the
nineteenth century sustaining the validity of field-of-use licensing. For exam-
ple, in 1869 the Supreme Court decided Rubber Co. v. Goodyear"6 which held
it to be an infringement for a licensee to practice a patent beyond the limited
purposes authorized in the license. Similarly, in 1872, the Supreme Court
decided Mitchell v. Hawley,"' which it later cited7 ' in General Talking Pic-
tures for the proposition that restrictive patent licenses are clearly legal. In
another case, decided four years prior to General Talking Pictures, the
Eighth Circuit upheld a field-of-use restriction in a manufacturing license,
writing that ". . . the patentee is not compelled to choose between granting
full and complete use under the patent or granting no use. He may attach such
limitations upon the use as do not go beyond the influence of his complete
monopoly without granting licenses." 7 2
General Talking Pictures, therefore, can be viewed as affirming the long-
established doctrine that field-of-use restrictions are inherent in the statutory
patent grant. Because the patentee possesses a legal monopoly in the patented
product or process-the right to exclude others entirely from exploitation of
As Part IlI of the article shows, American law does not adopt-nor would any policy consider-
ation appear to justify-such a limited view of permissible field-of-use restrictions.
66Proposal, supra note I, at art. 3(8).
"304 U.S. 175, aff'd on rehearing, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
61304 U.S. at 181.
"176 U.S. (9 Wall.) 788 (1869).
"183 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544 (1872).
'1305 U.S. at 127.
"Vulcan Mfg. Co. v. Maytag Co., 73 F.2d 136, 139 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. granted, 293 U.S.
553 (1935), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 294 U.S. 734 (1935); accord, Good Humor Corp. of
America v. Popsicle Corp. of United States, 59 F.2d 344 (D. Del. 1932), aff'd, 66 F.2d 659 (3d
Cir. 1933); Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng'r Corp., 266 F. 71, (2d Cir.
1920).
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the invention-he inherently possesses the right to relax a portion of that
monopoly by waiving part but not all of the patentee's right to exclude.
Despite numerous challenges, General Talking Pictures has not been over-
ruled and numerous courts have followed its teaching that field-of-use licens-
ing is a lawful exercise of rights encompassed by the grant of a patent monop-
oly. 7
3
Thus, insofar as Article 2.1(1) permits field-of-use restrictions in patent
licenses, the proposed group exemption is fully in accord with United States
law." The proposed group exemption and American jurisprudence part com-
"E.g., Bela Seating Co. v. Poloron Prods., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 489, (N.D. 111. 1968), aff'd, 438
F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co., Inc. v.
Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968); Armstrong v. Motorola, Inc., 374 F.2d 764 (7th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967); Coats Loaders & Stackers, Inc. v. Henderson, 233
F.2d 915 (6th Cir. 1956); Hazeltine Research v. Admiral Corp., 183 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 896 (1950); Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, 176 F.2d
799 (1st Cir. 1949), aff'don other grounds, 339 U.S. 827 (1950); Turner Glass Corp. v. Hartford-
Empire Co., 173 F.2d 49 53 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 830 (1949); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v.
Otte, [1978]1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 161,976 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) 49, 53 (7th Cir.) Munters Corp. v.
Burgess Indus. Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1195, (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken,
Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648,671 (D.S.C. 1977), aff'din part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 594 F.2d
974 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., [1976] 1 TRADE CAs. (CCH) 60,908
(D.N.J. 1976); Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972);
Barr Rubber Prods. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 277 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 425 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970);
Chemagro Corp. v. Universal Chemical Co., 244 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Tex. 1965); Reliance
Molded Plastics, Inc. v. Jiffy Products, 215 F. Supp. 402 (D.N.J. 1963), aff'dper curiam, 337
F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1964); Harte & Co., Inc. v. L. E. Carpenter & Co., 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 578
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Kaz Mfg. Co. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), aff'd, 317 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1963); Eversharp, Inc. v. Fisher Pen Co., 204 F. Supp. 649
(N.D. Ill. 1961); Sperry Products, Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 171 F. Supp. 901 (N.D.
Ohio 1959); aff'd on this issue; rev"d in part on other grounds, 285 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 890 (1961); Deering, Milliken & Co. v. Temp-Resisto Corp., 160 F. Supp. 463
(S.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'd in part on other grounds, 274 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v.
Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Mach. Co., 139 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Pa. 1956); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Bulldog Elec. Prods. Co., 106 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. W. Va. 1952), aff'd, 206 F.2d 574
(4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953); United States v. Consolidated Car-Heating
Co., 87 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Atlas Imperial Diesel Engine Co. v. Lanova
Corp., 79 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Del. 1948), following Lanova Corp. v. Atlas Imperial Diesel Engine
Co., 44 Del. 55, 55 A.2d 272 (1947). (Super. Ct. 1947); Shaw v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and
Co., 126 Vt., 206, 226 A.2d 903 (1967). Cf. United States v. Ethyl Gasoline Corp., 27 F. Supp.
959 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 436 (1940).
"See the following cases that uphold the validity of field-of-use limitations without citing to
General Talking Pictures: Williams v. Hughes Tool Co., 186 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 903 (1951); Extractol Process v. Hiram Walker & Sons, 153 F.2d 264, 266 (7th
Cir. 1946); American Lecithin Co. v. Warfield Co., 105 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 609 (1939); Ethyl Corp. v. Hercules Powder Co., 232 F. Supp. 453 (D. Del. 1964);
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 471 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1978); United States v.
Parker-Rust-Proof Co., 61 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1945).
The few cases in which field-of-use restrictions have been struck down involved reciprocal
restraints which were found to be part and parcel of horizontal agreements to divide markets (see
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1944)), or restrictions on the sale of
unpatented products produced under a patented process, (see United States v. Studiengesell-
schaft Kohle, m.b.H., 11978] 2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 62,291 (D.D.C. 1978)). Cf. Ethyl Corp. v.
Hercules Powder Co., 232 F. Supp. 453 (D. Del. 1963).
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pany, however, when it comes to the handling of restrictions on the way in
which, and the customers to whom, patented products may be sold.75 In
contrast to Article 3(8), the United States cases treat such restraints as legiti-
mate field-of-use restrictions that are an inherent part of the patent monop-
oly.
This is clear from General Talking Pictures itself, where the restriction at
issue precluded licensees from selling patented amplifiers to customers that
would use them in the commercial field and permitted sales only to those
customers that would use the amplifiers in the private field.76 General Talk-
ing Pictures squarely held that such restrictions on the customers to whom a
patented product may be sold are "not inconsistent with the scope of the
patent monopoly. . . .""
Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, the 1869 case relied upon in General Talking
Pictures, is to the same effect. The patent license in that case provided among
other things that it was not intended to convey to the licensee "any right to
make any contract with the Government of the United States." 7 Thus, the
agreement upheld by the Supreme Court in Rubber Co. v. Goodyear specifi-
cally restricted the licensee's sales to a particular customer.
The cases which have come down since General Talking Pictures reaffirm
the same principle. In Deering, Milliken & Co. v. Temp-Resisto Corp., de-
cided in 1958,'9 certain textile converters entered into license agreements
which in effect granted them the right to use and sell a patented heat-resistant
cloth provided that they limited their sales to customers in specified fields
such as apparel, bed coverings, gloves or footwear. Citing General Talking
Pictures, the New York federal district court stated that a "licensor can grant
"Article 3(8) prohibits restrictions as to "uses of the licensed products going beyond the
patent claims .... It is unclear how any use of a patented product can go beyond the patent
claims, since the function of a patent is to secure for its owner all rights to use, as well as
manufacture and sell, the patented invention. In any event, as shown in the text, to the extent
that Article 3(8) assumes that restrictions as to the way in which and the customers to whom
patented products may be sold go beyond the applicable patent claims, the provision is contrary
to American doctrine.
"in General Talking Pictures, American Telephone and Telegraph, General and R.C.A. to-
gether exclusively licensed their patents to some fifty companies for the manufacture of vacuum
tubes and amplifiers in the private field. The commercial field was apparently reserved to the
patentees' own subsidiaries, such as Western Electric. American Transformer, a licensee in the
private field, manufactured a common amplifier chassis that could be used in both the private
and commercial fields. It sold the amplifiers to General Talking Pictures, a producer of projec-
tors for commercial movie houses, even though both parties were aware that the buyer intended
to use the amplifiers commercially and that the seller was not licensed to manufacture them for
such use. The patentees sued General Talking Pictures, the buyer, to enjoin its use of the ampli-
fiers as an infringement. The Court found that because the licensee had knowingly made sales
outside the scope of its license and because the defendant had purchased the amplifiers knowing
this to be the case, both parties had infringed the patent. In so deciding, the Court upheld the
legality of the underlying field-of-use restriction.
"304 U.S. at 181.
"76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 799.
"160 F. Supp. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'd in part on other grounds, 274 F.2d 626 (2d Cir.
1960).
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a license to sell in certain areas of trade .. ."'0 Moreover, in 1967 the
Seventh Circuit squarely upheld license provisions restricting "the classes of
consumers to whom manufacturer-licensee could sell," rejecting the argu-
ment that General Talking Pictures was no longer good law."
The United States law is the same with respect to patent licensing agree-
ments which contain the other type of provision specified in Article 3(8), i.e.,
clauses that restrict the way in which a patented product may be sold. Thus, in
United States v. Ciba-Geigy Corp,8 " the court upheld a field-of-use restric-
tion that limited the licensee to manufacturing and selling the patented drug
in dosage form only, and not in bulk form. Rejecting the Justice De-
partment's position, the court followed General Talking Pictures in holding
that the restraint was a lawful field-of-use restriction which was within the
scope of the licensor's patent rights. Judge Meanor stated that
[any limitation contained in a patent license, by definition, results in a restraint
of trade. The restraint inheres in the grant of the patent itself which by its terms
conveys the power to exclude .... [TIhe legality of a limitation or series of limita-
tions can only be judged with reference to the scope of the monopoly created by the
letters patent. 3
Finding that the restriction in that case did not improperly augment the pat-
ent grant," ' the court concluded: "The inescapable fact is that the license...
opened up competition in an area in which [the patentee] had the legal right to
shut off all competition. . . . The restraint on competition inheres in the
patent monopoly itself."8
B. Policy Considerations
The policy considerations which support field-of-use restrictions in patent
licenses are much the same as those relating to territorial restraints. Both
types of provision limit only competition which would not exist at all without
the license, i.e., competition involving the use of the licensed patent. And
both make possible the licensing of patents that would otherwise not take
place in situations where the licensor, or a licensee, requires the protection of
having an exclusive geographical or commercial area in which to practice the
licensed technology.
"160 F. Supp. at 481.
"Armstrong v. Motorola, Inc., 374 F.2d 764, 774 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830,
rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 997 (1967). See also Channel Master Corp. v. JFD Electronics Corp.,
260 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1966). See also Hazeltine Research v. Admiral Corp., 183 F.2d 953,
(7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 896 (1950); Coats Loaders & Stackers, Inc. v. Henderson,
233 F.2d 915, (6th Cir. 1956); Channel Master Corp. v. JFD Electronics Corp., 260 F. Supp. 568,
(E.D.N.Y. 1966).
"1[19761 1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,908 (D.N.J. 1976).
"Id. at 68,961.
"The court distinguished Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945), and
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940), where through horizontal combina-
tions the patentees were able to exercise monopoly power greater than the legitimate monopolies
conferred by the patents. [1976] 1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,908 at 68,962.
"Id. at 68,963.
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As with territorial restrictions, the patent licensing which field-of-use pro-
visions encourage favors competition. In the long run, competition is aided
because the license puts the licensee in a position where it can begin compet-
ing with the licensor immediately after the patent expires. In the short run,
competition will become immediately possible at the secondary or distributor
level since, regardless of the purpose for which the patented product is ini-
tially sold, after the first sale the patent monopoly will be deemed to be
exhausted, which means that thereafter the product can be sold without re-
striction as to use. In addition, by making new technologies more widely
available than would otherwise be the case, licensing tends to increase com-
petition between newer and older technologies.
In addition, as with territorial restraints, field-of-use restrictions promote
the development and dissemination of technology. For example, some li-
censees may be unwilling to make the investment necessary to develop the
licensed technology in a particular commercial field without some assurance
that the licensor or other licensees will not be using the same patents to com-
pete for the business of the same group of customers. Similarly, some paten-
tees may be unwilling to license-and thereby to make their technology more
generally available-if they cannot reserve some designated commercial area
for themselves. In addition, licensors from other industrialized countries
may be unwilling to transfer technology to licensees in the Common Market
if they cannot impose any restrictions at all as to the way in which, or the
customers to whom, the products manufactured under their patents may be
sold.
Field-of-use restrictions also promote the interests of small and medium-
sized firms. First, by making possible the licensing of patents that might
otherwise not take place, such restrictions increase the opportunities for
small and medium-sized firms to obtain technology as licensees. In addition,
field-of-use restrictions allow smaller firms to license their patents to large
companies while preserving for themselves at least some commercial areas in
which they can practice their own technology without facing the competition
which the greater financial resources of their licensees would otherwise make
possible. It may be noted in this connection that, unlike the provisions relat-
ing to territorial restrictions, Article 3(8) prohibits restrictions as to methods
of sale and customers in the licensing agreements of all companies, regardless
of size.6 Thus, not even small and medium-sized companies can avail them-
selves of these restraints regardless of how necessary they may be to protect
such companies in a given licensing transaction.
Finally, there is no way that field-of-use restrictions can conceivably have
an adverse impact on economic integration. Unlike territorial restraints,
which may in some cases divide a common market into exclusive geographic
areas, perhaps coinciding with national boundaries, for the exploitation of
'Proposal, supra note 1, at art. 3(8).
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technology, field-of-use restrictions cut across such divisions and promote
the development of technology in commercial fields that extend geographi-
cally to the whole market.
In sum, in terms of every possible policy consideration, as well as in terms
of legal precedent and doctrine, the arguments for allowing properly ancil-
lary field-of-use restrictions in patent licenses affecting customers and
methods of sale are at least as strong as the arguments previously discussed
for allowing territorial restraints.
IV. Quantity Restrictions
Article 3(6) of the proposed group exemption prohibits licensing agree-
ments containing "restrictions on the maximum quantity of products to be
manufactured or marketed by the licensee or on the maximum number of
operations employing the patent."' 7 The rationale for this provision is set
forth in the preamble to the regulation as follows:
Since the Commission considers that control over the marketing of a licensed prod-
uct within the common market is not a matter that relates to the existence of the
patent, and since such control can be exercised indirectly by setting a maximum to
the quantity of products the licensee may manufacture or market or to the number
of operations for which he may employ the patent, the benefit of this Regulation is
for this reason alone not available for such an obligation. "8
American law again is directly to the contrary. Indeed, no United States
judicial decision has ever questioned the legality of a provision in a patent
license restricting the quantity of patented articles produced. As noted in
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.: 9 "The cases are to the
effect [that the] owner of a valid product patent may by license restrict pro-
duction of the licensee to a specified quantity, at a specified place." 9
Furthermore, quantity restrictions are upheld in the American cases precisely
because they are deemed to relate to the existence of a patent, i.e., to be
inherent to the patent monopoly. In Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson,9
which held lawful a restriction as to the number and type of unpatented
products that could be manufactured with a patented machine, the court
pointed out that "[diuring the period of time in which the patent remained
valid, the plaintiff could forbid entirely any use whatsoever of its patent." 92
Consequently, the licensing of the patent subject to a quantity restriction did
nothing to improperly expand the scope of the patent monopoly.
In fact, the general premise stated in the preamble-that the marketing of a
licensed product does not relate to the existence of a patent-is contrary to
"Id. art. 3(6).
"Id.
" 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
"Id. at 226.
"109 F. Supp. 657 (D.N.J. 1951), aff'd in part, modified in part, 207 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954).
"Id. at 660.
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United States doctrine.93 It is elementary in American law that a patent se-
cures to the inventor the exclusive right "to make, use and vend the thing
patented. . . ."" Thus, the right to control the initial marketing of patented
products is an inherent part of the patent monopoly. What is more, both
territorial and field-of-use restrictions obviously apply to the marketing of
licensed products; yet, as shown above, both are deemed to be within the
legitimate scope of the patent monopoly and therefore lawful. It follows a
fortiori that quantity restrictions, which only indirectly control the market-
ing of licensed products, should be permitted as a matter of law and policy.
V. Royalties Covering Nonpatented Products
Article 3.4(a) of the proposed regulation would make it improper for a
licensee to agree to pay royalties on products not covered by the licensed
patent." This would seem to prohibit common agreements such as those in
which a licensee obtains the right to use a whole portfolio of patents in ex-
change for a royalty based on some percentage of the licensee's total sales.
Under American law such arrangements are lawful so long as they are
adopted as a mutually convenient method for determining royalties rather
than being forced on the licensee as a condition to obtaining any license at
all. 96 As we shall show, the United States rule is in accord with common sense
as well as sound doctrine.
In Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine, the defendant li-
censed a group of 570 patents and 200 applications relating to the manufac-
ture of radio broadcasting apparatus. The plaintiff-licensee agreed to pay
royalties based upon a percentage of its total sales of radio broadcasting
receivers-regardless of the extent (if any) to which a given receiver was
produced under the licensed patents-as well as a fixed minimum royalty.
Holding that this arrangement did not constitute patent misuse, the Supreme
Court recognized that the royalty provision "was a convenient mode of
operation designed by the parties to avoid the necessity of determining
whether each type of petitioner's product embodies any of the numerous
Hazeltine patents." 9' The Court also concluded that "[tihis royalty provi-
sion does not create another monopoly; it creates no restraint of competition
beyond the legitimate grant of the patent.""'
The holding and rationale of Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v.
Hazeltine were reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Hazeltine. While ruling that a patentee may not condition the grant of a
:3Proposal, supra note 1, at art. l(2)(a).
4Patent Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 22, 16 Stat. 198, as quoted in Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell,
229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913) (emphasis added).
"5Proposal, supra note I, at art. 3.4(a).
'E.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine, 339 U.S. 827 (1950); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
:1339 U.S. at 833.
Old.
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license upon the payment of royalties on nonpatented products, the Court
reiterated that the parties may agree to use a percentage of the licensee's sales
as a convenient method for calculating the royalty to be paid. The Supreme
Court stated:
It could easily be, as the Court indicated in Automatic Radio, that the licensee as
well as the patentee would find it more convenient and efficient from several stand-
points to base royalties on total sales than to face the burden of figuring royalties
based on actual use. If convenience of the parties rather than patent power dictates
the total-sales royalty provision, there are no misuse of the patents and no forbid-
den conditions attached to the license.99
The Court also upheld a clause providing for the payment of a fixed mini-
mum royalty: ". . [the licensee] must anticipate some minimum charge for
the license-enough to insure the patentee against loss in negotiating and
administering his monopoly, even if in fact the patent is not used at all." 00
As a matter of policy, there would appear to be no reason for not allowing
percentage-of-sales royalties and minimum royalty provisions that serve the
convenience of the parties and that make possible agreements on licensing
which might otherwise be difficult or impossible to effectuate. Where such
royalty provisions are adopted by mutual agreement and without coercion,
they have no anticompetitive or other socially undesirable effects. On the
other hand, they clearly facilitate commercial dealings and transfers of tech-
nology that provide important benefits for society. For these reasons, it
would appear that the pragmatic approach adopted by United States law,
which permits voluntary agreements on royalties and condemns only those
coercive arrangements that are likely to have anticompetitive effects, is pref-
erable to a doctrinaire condemnation of all agreements to pay royalties on
nonpatented products regardless of the economic and business conse-
quences.
VI. Grantbacks
Article 2.1(8) of the proposed regulations exempts from Article 85(1) those
license provisions which impose on a licensee "the obligation to pass on to the
licensor any experience gained in working the invention and to grantback
licenses in respect of inventions relating to improvements and new applica-
tions of the original invention, provided that this obligation is non-exclusive
and the licensor is bound by a like obligation." (emphasis added)"° ' Article
3(12), on the other hand, condemns licensing agreements which include "the
obligation on the part of the licensee to assign to the licensor rights in or rights
to patents for improvements or new applications of the licensed patent." ,02
The effect of the regulation is thus to permit grantbacks so long as they are
99395 U.S. at 138.
'
0Id. at 140.
' 'Proposal, supra note 1, at art. 2.1(8).
'"Id. art. 3(12).
424 INTERNATIONAL LA WYER
nonexclusive and impose a reciprocal obligation on the licensor.
It is unclear, however, what is meant by the proviso in Article 2.1(8) that a
grantback be "non-exclusive." In particular, the regulation does not distin-
guish between an exclusive grantback which allows the licensee the right to
practice his improvement patent and one which does not.' 03 Yet the distinc-
tion between those two types of exclusive grantback provisions may be signif-
icant as a matter of both law and policy. The leading American case on the
legality of grantbacks is the Supreme Court's 1947 decision in Transparent-
Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes& Smith Co. (Transwrap). 'o There the Court
upheld the legality of a grantback clause requiring the licensee to assign im-
provement patents to the licensor. However, the licensing arrangement sus-
tained in Transwrap allowed the licensee to utilize the granted-back improve-
ment patents; and, for that reason, the Court found there was no disincentive
for the licensee to make inventions. '5 On the other hand, the Court recog-
nized that a licensee might well be discouraged from innovating where he was
required to assign to the licensor all rights to improvement patents, including
rights to his own inventions. In the words of Justice Douglas's opinion in
Transwrap, a grantback provision might give the licensee "less incentive to
make inventions when he is bound to turn over to the licensor the products of
his inventive genius."' 0 6
Similarly, in terms of its impact on competition, a grantback clause which
precludes the licensee from retaining rights to his own inventions is more
severe than one which merely prevents the licensee from licensing improve-
ment patents to others. Among other things, the former type of clause insu-
lates the licensor from competition not only from third parties but also from
the licensee himself.
Another factor which the proposed group exemption apparently fails to
take into account is the duration and scope of the grantback provision.
Where the duration of the licensor's exclusive rights under the improvement
patents is limited to the life of the original patents licensed, and where the
patent in the main license is a basic or blocking patent which would preclude
the practice of the improvement patents in any event, then a grantback which
is exclusive as against third parties would have no anticompetitive effect. As
the Second Circuit concluded on remand in Transwrap, where the original
patents dominated the improvement patents, the patentee-licensor's "con-
trol over the industry will be no greater by virtue of the improvement pat-
ents. . . ."101
"'Id. art. 2.1(8).
"'329 U.S. 637 (1947).
*1329 U.S. at 646. The licensee in Transwrap also incurred no additional royalty for utilizing
the improvement.
"0'329 U.S. at 646.
"O'Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Machine Co., 161 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947). See also United States v. du Pont Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, (D. Del.
1953), aff'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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Thus, for a number of reasons, United States law and policy suggest that
the blanket condemnation of exclusive grantbacks in the proposed group
exemption may be overly broad. On the other hand, as a practical matter,
exclusive grantback provisions which would prevent a licensee from using his
own technology are seldom used by American companies. ' Grantback pro-
visions which are exclusive as against third parties are usually of little conse-
quence because the patents in the main license generally do block the use of
improvement patents, and the duration of the grantback generally is limited
to the life of the original patents. Consequently, this is one area of the law
where the disparity between American jurisprudence and the proposed group
exemption may not be overly disruptive.
Somewhat more disturbing is the requirement in the proposed group ex-
emption that a grantback clause must impose a like obligation on the licensor
to license future improvement patents to the licensee. This provision has no
parallel at all in American law. Moreover, there may be many cases where
such a requirement of reciprocity would be commercially unacceptable to a
licensor. For example, a licensor may be unwilling to license a patent without
some assurance that it will obtain the benefits of its licensee's improvements.
If the licensor is a large company which invests huge sums in research and
development, it may likewise be unwilling to promise the licensee all of its
future related technology, which may consist of a great many improvement
patents, in exchange for the uncertain prospect that the licensee may come up
with a few improvements of its own. The result, then, may be that the licensor
will refuse to license at all if it cannot obtain a grantback clause without
incurring a reciprocal obligation. In short, while there may be many cases
where reciprocity in the licensing of improvement patents is eminently rea-
sonable, there are likely to be other cases where such a requirement makes no
commercial sense. For this reason there would appear to be a good deal to be
said as a matter of policy for the American rule, which in effect leaves this
matter to the parties to be resolved by negotiation.
VII. Price Restrictions
Article 3(7) of the draft regulation would proscribe licensing agreements
which contain "restrictions on one or both parties concerning prices, price
components or rebates, or recommendations from one party to the other
concerning any of such matters." (emphasis added)'" 9
The prohibition of price recommendations in patent licenses is contrary to
United States law. As far back as 1919, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Colgate & Co. "I recognized the legality of price recommendations under the
"'Oppenheim & Scott, Empirical Study of Limitations in Domestic Patent and Know-How
Licensing: A Preliminary Report, 14 IDEA 193, 200 (1970), sets forth the result of a poll which
shows, inter alia, that, "Generally the companies using exclusive-license and assignment grants-
back find it necessary to use them only 'occasionally' or 'seldom.'"
"'Proposal, supra note, I at art. 3(7).
110250 U.S. 300 (1919).
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Sherman Act. That case held that a manufacturer could unilaterally refuse
to sell to dealers who did not maintain the manufacturer's suggested resale
prices. Moreover, the Court stated that the manufacturer or trader "may
announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell.""' 
As the law has evolved since Colgate, when a supplier goes beyond a mere
announcement of suggested resale price and a simple refusal to deal and
employs other means to effect adherence to the suggested prices, a combina-
tion in violation of the Sherman Act may be found. But price recommenda-
tions without more are valid, and, indeed, such recommendations have been
upheld in the specific context of a patent license agreement.' 2
The proscription of restrictions on price in patent licenses set forth in Arti-
cle 3(7) is also contrary to the Supreme Court's 1926 decision in United States
v. General Electric Co. ' In that case, by the terms of Westinghouse's license
under General Electric's process and product patents, which covered "com-
pletely the making of modern electric lights,'' 4 General Electric had the
right to fix, and to change at its discretion, the prices charged for electric
lamps manufactured and sold by Westinghouse.'" The Court upheld the
price-fixing restrictions on the grounds that a patentee may license his patent
"upon any condition the performance of which is reasonably within the re-
ward which the patentee by the grant of the patent is entitled to secure."' 6
The Court reasoned that the price restrictions were "normally and reason-
ably adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the patentee's monopoly" be-
cause the price at which a licensee sells the patented product is directly related
to the profit that a patentee, himself, can derive from the sale of the same
article. '"
General Electric has survived challenge twice' 8 when there was no major-
ity on the Court to either reaffirm or overrule the General Electric doctrine;
and although qualified and limited by subsequent decisions,'" the case re-
mains valid law. As with grantbacks, however, the disparity between the
I"Id. at 307.
'"See, e.g., American Indus. Fastener Corp. v. Flushing Enterprises Inc., 362 F. Supp. 32, 40
(N.D. Ohio 1973) (patent license clause providing suggested retail price for patented device held
permissible in the absence of steps to induce adherence to suggested prices). Accord, Ansul Co.
v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972).




"'Id. at 490. The General Electric decision followed the Supreme Court's 1902 decision in
Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902) which held that the Sherman Act did not
refer to restraints arising from reasonable and legal conditions imposed by a patent owner or a
licensee, such as restricting the terms upon which the article may be used and the price to be
demanded therefor.
'"United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 382 U.S. 197 (1965); United States v. Line Material Co.,
333 U.S. 287 (1948).
'"E.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948) (two or more patent owners
cannot combine their patents and fix prices); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333
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proposed group exemption and United States law is not of major signifi-
cance. As a practical matter, American companies rarely seek to impose price
restrictions in patent licenses, and thus, at least in this regard, the proposed
group exemption would not have a material impact on their operations.
However, the prohibition of pricing recommendations does run counter to
American law, and this provision of the regulation, like some of the other
provisions previously discussed above, might well discourage some American
firms from licensing in the European Community.
Conclusion
As demonstrated above, the proposed group exemption will effectively
prevent companies with both patented and unpatented technology from
engaging in a wide variety of practices that are legal under United States law
and that generally serve significant, legitimate commercial and social pur-
poses. Thus, under the draft regulation, no licensor or licensee of any appre-
ciable size would be able to impose a territorial restriction or have an exclu-
sive sales area; it would be impossible for any company to enter into a
terminable know-how license or to impose territorial or field of use restric-
tions in such licenses; no company could seek assurances as to the manner in
which, or customers to whom, products manufactured under its patents
would be sold; no quantity restrictions in patent licenses would be allowed;
no licensing agreements would be permitted which, for the convenience of the
parties, based royalty payments on a percentage of the licensee's total sales;
grantbacks would be forbidden except in cases where the licensor was willing
to license all improvement patents to the licensee; and no licensing agreement
would be sanctioned under which the licensor could make pricing recommen-
dations to the licensee.
All of these types of restraints are generally accepted in the United States-
and, we believe, throughout the industrialized world-as appropriate means
by which transferors of patents and know-how can protect themselves
against having their own technology used against them and/or assure them-
selves of a fair return on their research and development investments. The net
effect of the multiple prohibition of all of these standard provisions will
inevitably be to discourage patent and know-how licensing and force those
who own technology to hoard it-in the case of patents, for the life of the
patent grant's in the case of know-how, indefinitely or at least until such time
as the invention is honestly discovered by someone else.
As we have stated, patent and know-how licensing promotes competition;
U.S. 364 (1948) (patentee cannot "acting in concert with all members of an industry . . . issue
substantially identical licenses to all members of the industry under the terms of which the
industry is completely regimented..." (Id. at 400)); United States v. Vehicular Parking, 54 F.
Supp. 828 (D. Del. 1944) (patentee cannot fix prices of unpatented articles even though related to
patented articles).
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it promotes the development and dissemination of technology; it helps small
and medium-sized businesses in a variety of ways; and, by making possible
the transfer of technology, it fosters economic integration. Hence, by impos-
ing disabilities calculated to discourage licensing, the proposed group exemp-
tion is likely to be counterproductive with respect to each of these policy
goals.
It is also important to note that the prohibitions in the proposed group
exemption which we have enumerated have never existed in United States
law. Nevertheless, the United States has maintained an unexcelled record for
vigorous antitrust enforcement; it has experienced tremendous investment in
research and development and a high level of technological progress; it has
fostered the interests of small and medium-sized businesses; and it has
without question achieved economic integration and a common market
among its fifty states. Thus, based on the American experience, there would
appear to be no basis for concluding that the licensing practices which the
proposed group exemption would forbid have ever operated to the detriment
of the economy, the consumer interest or society at large.
In sum, the objections to the practices which the draft regulation would
condemn would appear to be more theoretical than practical, and more doc-
trinaire than rooted in a meaningful analysis of the relevant policy consider-
ations. We believe that there is something to be learned from the American
experience in this area; and that before the European Community codifies a
set of rules which departs radically both from the law that has evolved in the
United States and from worldwide commercial practice, it would do well to
make sure first that the practices it is eliminating are in fact harmful rather
than socially beneficial.
